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SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT:
AN OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
RECENT FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
PAUL NI. LAURENZA *
In the past several years, the federal antimerger statute, section 7 of the
Clayton Act,' has undergone a significant judicial reassessment. Generally, the
section 7 decisions of the Burger Court and the lower courts reflect a mark-
edly more tolerant judicial attitude toward corporate mergers than was evi-
dent. during the merger conscious years' of the Warren Court..`' This shift in
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* Member. District of Columbia Bar.
' 15 U.S.C.	 18 (1976). In pertinent part § 7 provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly. the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and HO
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section
of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Commenting on the first 	 7 decisions of the Burger Court. one author
noted:
The new majority is proceeding on a case-by-case basis that. tends to defy
generally-applicable rules, that makes substantive presumptions in favor of
the validity of the challenged merger, and that imposes procedural bur-
dens in a manner that favors defendants' success. Moreover, the new
majority ... has raised the threshold of illegality perceptibly above that
which was the legacy of the Warren Court.
Fox, AntitrUsl„Alergers, awl the Supreme Court: The Politics of Section 7 of the Claytou Act,
26 NI ERCER L. REV. 389, 390-91 (1975) (footnote omitted).
3 For a discussion of the "merger wave" of the 1060 .s. see P. STEINER, MERG-
ERS 1-29 (1975).
A telling statistic in this regard is that the Warren Court's twelve substantive
opinions in government § 7 cases all favored the plaintiff. See Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969): United States v. Third Nat'l Bank. 390 U.S. 171
(1968); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967): United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1 966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966); FTC y. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Peep-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America. 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 291
(1962). In contrast, the present Court has decided four merger cases on their tillbSUI/I-
CIVe merits since 1974, all in Favor of the defendants. See United States v. American
Bldg. Maintenance Indus.. 422 U.S. 271 ( 1975): United States v. Citizens & Southern
Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975): United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602 (1974); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). Also. in
United States v. Connecticut Nail Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666-73 (1974). although the
Court remanded for it proper delineation of relevant markets, the Court's opinion
clearly rejected several of the government's key legal contentions.
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judicial perspective in turn has forced the federal antitrust enforcement agen-
cies'' to reconsider the advisability of challenging certain kinds of mergers not.
long ago regarded as clearly susceptible to the proscriptions of section 7."
Most significant_ among recent section 7 cases are those decisions dealing
with the sufficiency of market Share and concentration analysis as a measure
of a merger's probable competitive effect in the relevant. market, and with
application of the potential competition doctrine. This article reviews recent
judicial development in these two areas and attempts 10 assess their implica-
tions for section 7 enforcement.
I. MARKET SHARE AND CONCENTRATION ANALYSIS
In analyzing challenged horizontal mergers, the courts traditionally have
relied heavily, if' not solely, on the government's market share and concentra-
tion data to determine the legality of the merger.' Other quantitative cvi-
Although the term "government - in the enforcement context usually denotes the
justice Department, the term is applied throughout this article to both the Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission.
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission have concur-
rent authority to enforce 7—the justice Department in the courts, 15 U.S.C. 25
(1970), and the FIG through administrative proceedings, IS U.S.C. 21(a) (1970).
The Sherman Act, IS U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), which also is applicable to mergers in
certain instances, see, e.g., United States v. First Nall Bank & Trust Co., 370 U.S. (165
(1901) (Lexingion Bank), is enforceable by the Justice Department. 15 U.S.C, § 4 (197(i).
Section 5 of' the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45 (1970), which may
constitute an independent basis for merger challenge, but see FTC v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (discussed in text at notes 100-24 infra), is enforce-
able by the FTC.
The Justice Department maintains Merger Guidelines which set forth generalized
criteria the Department will ordinarily apply in reviewing mergers. See I TRADE REC.
REP. (CC I'!) ¶ 4510. The FTC has issued merger guidelines with respect to a few
selected industries. See, e.g., id. ¶ 4520 (vertical mergers in cement industry).
See., e.g.. Testimony of 1i. Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Commis-
si(ni, in Hellthigs on Conglomerate Mergers 13("We the Sulumum. on Aniiirusi awl Monopoly of
the Senate judiciary Comm., 951h (;ongress. 2d Sess. 148 (1978); Remarks of Daniel C.
Schwartz, Deputy Director, Federal Trade Commission, "The FTC's Role in the Pre-
sent Competitive Environment, - at 21-22, Lewis and Clark Law School Third Annual
Antitrust Symposium (Feb. 24, 1978); Interview with John FL Shenefield, Assistant
Attorney General. 834 ANT....RusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1, A-4 to A-5 (Oct. 13,
1977).
In t he 111i(ISI of these judicial and agency reappraisals, Congress enacted t he
Hart -Senn - Rodin° Antitrust Improvements Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1970), as
implemewed by 10 C.F.R. tft; 801-03 (1978), a major procedural supplement to § 7 de-
signed to facilitate merger enforcement by requiring detailed premerger reporting to
the FTC and the Antitrust Division and by establishing mandatory post-notification
waiting periods prior to consummation of the merger.
7 Illustrative of the Warren Court's reliance on government statistical presen-
tations are United States v. Von's Grocery Co„ 384 U.S. 270, 272-73 (1906); United
States v. Continental Can Co.. 378 U.S. 441, 158-112 (114114); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271. 278 (1961); United States v. Philadelphia
Nall Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 331 (1903). In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 321-22 (1902), the Warren Court emphasized "that a merger had to be function-
ally viewed, in the context of" its particular industry. - and set forth various Factual
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deuce and any qualitative justifications offered to rebut the government's
statistical presentation have been disregarded. In its 1974 opinion in United
Stales v. General Dynamics Corp.," however, the Burger Court. significantly al-
tered this approach to merger analysis.
In General Dynamics, the government challenged the acquisition of United
Electric Coal by Material Service and its successor, General Dynamics. In the
state of Illinois, one of the two geographic market constructions proffered by
the government, United Electric and Material Service ranked first in com-
bined coal sales with 23.2 percent of the Illinois market in 1959, the year of
the acquisition. In the Eastern Interior Coal Province, the government's other
relevant market construction, the two firms held a combined sales share of
12.4 percent, sufficient for a second place market ranking in 1959. By 1967,
when the government filed its complaint, the combined shares of the two
companies in Illinois and the Province had decreased slightly to 21.8 and 10.9
percent., respectively." In both of these markets, concentration had increased
substantially in the ten years prior to 1967, with the top four firms in each
market enhancing their aggregate share by approximately 20 percent."
The district court.," in rejecting the government's section 7 challenge,
held that the government's production market share and concentration data,
while statistically accurate, were not reliable indicia of competition in the coal
industry." Affirming the district court's judgment,'" the Supreme Court ini-
tially determined that the concentration levels and trend toward increased
concentration approximated statistics in several earlier section 7 cases decided
in the government's favor. 14 These concentration figures, coupled with the
market shares of the acquiring and acquired companies, led the Court to con-
clude that the government had made a prima facie showing of a section 7
violation in accordance with earlier decisions of the court." This prima facie
case, however, was not. sufficient to withstand defendants' rebuttal evidence.
Of particular importance to the Court in General Dynamics was the lower
court's finding that competition in the industry was based primarily on the
ability of coal producers to procure long-term contract commitments from
major coal purchasers.'" The Supreme Court viewed this ability, rather than
considerations of importance in this regard. Id. at 322. In Philadelphia Bank and later
cases, however, the Court essentially abandoned functional analysis in favor 14 the
structural-presumptive approach articulated in Philadelphia Bank. 374 U.S. at 363-72.
s 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
'' Id. at 496.
Id. at 494.
" United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Stipp. 534 (N.D. III. 1972).
1.2 Id. at 560.
'" 415 U.S. at 511.
' 4 Id. at 494 ge 101 (citing United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546,
551 (1966), and United States v. Von's Grocery Co„ 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) (White,
J.. concurring))•
15 415 U.S. at 496.
'" 341 F. Stipp. at 543. Examining the coal industry in the post-World War II
cra in detail, the district court observed that the competitive significance of sales in the
spot market had diminished substantially relative to the growing importance of the
long-term coal requirements of the electric utilities, the major coal consumers. Id. at
538-44.
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present production capability, as the true "focus of competition" in the coal
industry.'"' To secure such commitments, a producer would require coal re-
serves in addition to those already bound to long-term contract obligations.
Because of United Electric's weak position in uncommitted coal reserves and
its inability to secure new reserves,is the lower court found, and the Supreme
Court agreed, that United Electric could not continue as a significant. com-
petitor despite its substantial past and present coal production.'" In response
to the government's contention that the defendants in essence were invoking
the Failing company defense without meeting the stringent requirements of
that doctrine,'" the Court stated that the defendants' evidence of United Elec-
tric's weak reserves position was not an assertion of the company's impending
failure, but rather constituted a refutation of the "heart of the Government's
statistical prima facie case based on production figures .... " 21
In short, the Court in General Dynamics demonstrated a new willingness to
consider rebuttal evidence in determining whether the government's statistical
case accurately depicts the probable effect. of the challenged merger on compe-
tition. It is true, of course, that in earlier section 7 cases, such as Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States 22 and United Slates v. Philadelphia National Bank,'" the Warren
Court recognized that. defendants' evidence could rebut the government's
prima facie statistical case. But it was equally clear from the Warren Court's
later section 7 decisions that attempting to overcome the government's market
' 7 415 U.S. at 501.
'" "While United ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in terms of an-
nual production, it was 10th in reserve holdings, and controlled less than 1% of the
reserves held by coal producers in Illinois, Indiana, and western Kentucky." Id. at 502
(citing 341 F. Stipp. at 538).
415 U.S. at 503-04.
2 " 'Fhe judicially created failing company defense, first articulated in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. FTC. 280 U.S. 291 (193(1), and discussed in recent Supreme Court
cases, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 506-07 (I 974);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1971); Citizen Pub-
lishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136-39 (1969), provides that a merger
otherwise illegal under 7 is permissible if the acquired company is in failing condi-
tion and there are no alternative purchasers of the c o mpany less objectionable fro m a
competitive standpoint than the acquiring firm. Because of the rigors of these stan-
dards, the failing company defense, though often asserted, has been successful in only
a few cases. United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 777 & n.89
(D. Md. 1976). See generally Blum, The Failing Company Doctrine, 16 B.C. 1Nn. & Coat. L.
REN. 75 (1974).
" 415 U.S. at 508. In theory, of course, the General Dynamics rebuttal defenses
and the failing company defense do not reflect the same set of value considerations. In
the former context, the concern is whether the government's statistical case is a reliable
prediction of probable competitive effect—in short, the determination essentially is
limited to competitive ramifications in the relevant. market. In the latter case, the con-
cerns focus more broadly on competitive effects and on the possible injury to
shareholders, creditors, employees, and the communities where the failing company's
operations are located, if the company actually fails. See, e.g., United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S.
291. 302 (1930).
370 U.S. 294, 322 (1962).
2 " 374	 U.S. 321. 363 (1963).
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share and concentration case was almost certainly a futile exercise."'' Thus, in
shifting away from this virtually exclusive reliance on market shares, the
Court in General Dynamics made its most pronounced departure from the line
of Warren Court decisions that had established market share analysis as the
conclusive determinant of a merger's probable competitive effect. Inasmuch as
General Dynamics focused primarily on the absence of natural resources, how-
ever; its value as precedent in cases involving less readily quantifiable types of
rebuttal evidence remained unclear 2 !' until the Court itself provided further
guidance in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc.' and United States v.
Citizens Co' Southern National Bank.'
In Marine Bancorportation, a potential competition case," the government's
evidence that the top three banks held 92 percent of the relevant market was
held to establish a prima facie case of market concentration. 29 In finding that
the defendants had not overcome this aspect of the government's case, the
Court, citing General Dynamics, observed that the defendants had not pre-
sented significant evidence of actual market behavior—particularly the ab-
sence of parallel pricing or other parallel marketing conduct—that might have
refuted the oligopolistic market presumption established by the government's
concentration ratios.""
The implication in Marine Bancorporation that. General Dynamics could ex-
tend beyond structural evidence to encompass other evidence questioning the
predictive reliability of the government's market share case was again appar-
ent in Citizens & Southern. 3 ' The government sought to enjoin under section
7 the proposed stock acquisitions by Citizens & Southern National Bank (C&S)
of several C&S-affiliated banks. Because of Georgia's restrictions on de jure
branch banking, C&S had formed the affiliated banks as de facto branches,
contemplating acquisition if and when the state amended its law to permit de
jure branching." Although C&S owned only 5 percent of the stock of each
of the branch banks, several factors, such as the ownership of much of the
remaining stock by parties friendly to the C&S system, the branches' use of
the C&S logo, the provision of the full range of C&S services by the branches,
and the close and continual supervision of the branch banks' financial and
" 4 See note 4 supra.
25 General Dynamics arguably can be read narrowly as a market definition case
in which the Court chose to focus on one category of market shares rather than that
proposed by the government. See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural
Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 10 n.35 (1977); Knapp, General Dynamics, Mirage or Oasis?,
26 MERCER L. REv. 577, 581 (1975); but see Posner. Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 CoLum. REv. 282, 311 (1975).
418 U.S. 602 (1974).
" 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
28 Although Marine Bancorporation is relevant to the question of the scope of
General Dynamics generally, the more important aspects of the case center on its
analysis of the potential competition doctrine. Sec text and notes 78-101 infra.
2 " 418 U.S. at 631.
3U Id. at 631-32 & n.34.
3 ' 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
Id. at 89-90.
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managerial operations by C&S, evidenced much closer ties between C&S and
the branches."
Upon amendment of Georgia law to allow de jure branching, C&S sought
to acquire the branch banks. The justice Department's suit for injunctive re-
lief 34 maintained in part. that the relationship between C&S and the branches
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. As to section 7, the government argued
that the proposed acquisitions would preclude the competition that would
otherwise exist between C&S and the branches but for the section I violations
and would foreclose the possibility of future competition between C&S and
the branches irrespective of whether their present interrelationship
transgressed the Sherman Act." After affirming the district court's finding
that C&S's formation of the de facto branches and the continuation of the
C&S-branch bank relationship did not infringe section I, the Court held that
the government. had established a prima facie case under section 7 on the
basis of market shares and concentration ratios. 3" Accordingly, the defend-
ants were required to demonstrate that the government's statistical presenta-
tion did not accurately depict the acquisitions' probable impact. on competi-
tion." 7
The defendants' rebuttal burden was met by establishing that the absence
of past and present competition was not the result of Sherman Act violations,
but rather logically stemmed from C&S's own formation of the branch banks
and, as originally contemplated by C&S, its extremely close bond with those
banks. Therefore, it would have been unrealistic to expect. that any competi-
tion would have developed among the branch banks or between them and the
parent C&S. 38 This same finding also was probative with respect to the more
difficult issue of possible foreclosure of future competition. While the Court
acknowledged the theoretical possibility of the branch banks' future severance
of tics with C&S, it saw no objective or subjective evidence to suggest a
reasonable probability that this would occur, since the relationship between
the branches and C&S was mutually beneficial and none of the officers, direc-
tors, or shareholders of the branch banks had shown any inclination to break
the long-standing link. 35 Thus, while in General Dynamics the probability of a
substantial lessening of competition was precluded by the acquired firm's deli-
33 Id. at 89, 92-93.
34 United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 372 F. Supp. Cilti (N.D.
Ga. 1974).
35 Id. at 618.
"" 422 U.S. at 120. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court found it
necessary to reach the question of geographic market definition. The Court assu med
for analytical purposes the correctness of the government's various geographic market
constructions. Id.
37 Id. (citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 48(3. 497-98
(1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, (331 (1974)).
38 In its discussion of the Sherman Act claim the Court noted the "total lack of
realism in suggesting that C&S might have founded new banks that would have com-
peted vigorously with it and with each other...," 422 U.S. at 119 (citation omitted).
3" id. at 121-22.
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dent resources, in Citizens and Southern that probability was foreclosed because
the acquiring and acquired entities had always legitimately functioned not as
competitors, but essentially as a single integrated system.
The application of General Dynamics in Marine Bancorporation and Citizens
& Southern left. little room for a narrow reading of General Dynamics, and in-
stead reflected a broad functional approach to analysis of how a merger is
likely to impact. on competition in the relevant market. -Ibis expanded range
of factual inquiry has been evident in post-General Dynamics lower court deci-
sions,'" the most significant of which is the Seventh Circuit's decision in United
States v. International Harvester Co.'"
The subject of the government's challenge in Harvester was the 1974 ac-
quisition by International Harvester, a leading producer of various kinds of
heavy equipment, of a 39 percent interest in Steiger Tractor, a substantial
producer of farm tractors. The operative agreements between Harvester and
Steiger, consisting of a stock purchase and a manufacturing agreement., con-
templated a stock acquisition plus a production supply arrangement whereby
Steiger, using Harvester's design and Harvester-supplied components, would
produce tractors, a portion of which Harvester was to purchase from
Steiger. ''-' In shipments of four-wheel drive farm tractors in the United
States,'" Steiger held approximately 14 percent and Harvester 8 percent of
total industry shipments, ranking third and sixth, respectively." The market.
was highly concentrated, with the top four firms accounting for 73 percent of
all industry shipments.;' Relying on this substantial market share overlap
and concentration," the government. contended that. the acquisition would
eliminate competition between Harvester and Steiger and substantially in-
crease concentration in the already concentrated four-wheel drive market.'
The district court's" examination of the defendants' operations under
the stock purchase and manufacturing agreements showed that Harvester had
4" E.g., United States v. International Harvester Co.. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir.
1977); United States v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 455 F. Supp. 142 (F.D. Pa. 1978);
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); United
States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 0511 (1). Conn. 1975); United States v. M.P.M.,
397 F. Supp. 78 (1). Colo. 1975). See United States v. CtiIbro Corp., 430 F. Stipp. 746
(S.D.N,Y. 1077); United Stares v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 1977-I Trade Gas. ¶ 01,518
(F.D. Pa. 1977).
504 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977),
'2 ht. at 7715.
The patties had stipulated the production and sale of four-wheel drive farm
tractors as relevant product markets and the United States as the relevant geographic
market. Id. at 772.
44 Id. at 771.
4
4" The Merger Guidelines, supra note 5, specify that where the top four firms
hold approximately 75% or more of the market, horizontal mergers in that market
ordinarily will be challenged if the merging firms each have 4% or more of the mar-
ket. As noted, Steiger and Harvester' held 14% and 8%, respectively, of industry ship-
ments of four-wheel drive faun tractors.
'17 504 F.2d at 771.
United States v. International Harvester Co., 1970-2 Trade Gas. ¶ 151,028
(N.D. III. 1976).
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neither sought nor gained control over Steiger through the agreements, 49 and
that competition between the two firms after the acquisition was "intense.""
Additionally, the district court found that competition in the industry after
the acquisition had increased through the strengthening of Harvester and
Steiger individually, by the expansion of other competitors' operations, and
through new market ent•ies. 5 ' Clearly the most significant. rebuttal evidence,
however, was the weak financial position of Steiger prior to the acquisition.
From 1970, the year after its incorporation, to 1973, just prior to its agreements
with Harvester, Steiger suffered successive heavy losses and critical deficien-
cies in cash and working capital. As a result of its financial and operating
problems, Steiger was tillable to attract needed equity capital or secure addi-
tional credit from its lending banks, and was forced to resort to a commercial
credit firm for necessary financing."
In light of Steiger's financial difficulties, the district court held that the
government had failed to establish that Harvester's acquisition of Steiger
would lessen competition in the relevant markets." The Seventh Circuit, in
affirming the district court's judgment, held that under the reasoning of Gen-
eral Dynamics the defendants' rebutt'al evidence overcame the government's
prima facie market. share case.' 4 The court found that even if Steiger had
remained in the market as an independent concern, it would have lacked the
necessary capital to compete effectively." That the lacking competitive "re-
sources" were financial did not deter the appeals court since it found that use
of production and sales data, without consideration of future availability of
capital, was no more reliable an analytical measure of probable ability to com-
pete than was use of coal production and sales data without reference to un-
com ► itted coal reserves. 5" Moreover, as the court further observed, the in-
quiry generated by General Dynamics, as construed in subsequent decisions, was
not confined to the absence of natural or monetary resources, but rather ex-
tended to encompass perhaps any evidence indicating the possible unreliabil-
ity of the government's statistical case as a measure of probable competitive
effect."
49
 Id. at 69,537.
Id. at 69,540-41.
5 ' Id. A slight concentration decrease and the prospects of additional new en-
trants were cited as manifestations of the increasing competitiveness of the four-wheel
drive farm tractor market. Id.
52 Id. at 69,531-33.
53 Id. at 69,541.
" 564F.2d at 780. The Seventh Circuit indicated two related ways in which a
government statistical case may he inadequate. The statistics themselves may have been
improperly chosen, thereby failing to focus on the essential competitive activity, or the
statistics, while correctly selected, may not fully reflect market conditions, Id. at 773-74
& n.8. Strictly viewed, only the latter is a true rebuttal of the prima fade case; the
former, which in some respects is more closely analogous to an improper definition of
the relevant market, questions whether the government has actually established its
prima facie case.
Id. at 774.
5" Id. at 773 n.7,
" Id. (citing United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Batik, 422 U.S. 86
(1975); United States v. Marine Bancorporation. inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United
States v. Amax, Enc.. 402 F. Supp. 956 (I). Conn. 1975)).
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Along with its explicit recognition of the broad range of potential de-
fenses available under General Dynamics, Harvester is significant in that it
clarifies the relationship between the traditional failing company defense and
the possible rebuttal defenses cognizable under General Dynamics, without un-
dermining the conceptual distinction between the two. The evidence pre-
sented on the issue of Steiger's inability to secure necessary capital in Harvester
is the same type of evidence typically introduced to substantiate the first re-
quirement of a failing company defense—specifically, that the acquired firm
is failing to the point of imminent bankruptcy." The defendants in Harvester
did not rely on the failing company doctrine, but the Seventh Circuit inti-
mated that the defendants may well have been unable to prove the requisite
condition of imminent failure to the degree the courts appear to require.'"
In any event, once the court had determined that Steiger's financial condition
precluded the probability of substantial anticompetitive effect, consideration
of the failing company defense was obviated. Conversely, in those cases in
which the weakened financial condition of the acquired firm would not neces-
sarily rebut the prima facie proof of probable anticompetitive effect, the
rationale of General Dynamics and Harvester would be inapplicable, and evi-
dence of failing financial circumstances would he relevant only to considera-
tion of the traditional failing company defense.
Harvester's recognition of evidence of financial weakness as establishing a
defense under General Dynamics thus should not be read to suggest that the
Harvester defense and the failing company defense are without significant dis-
tinction, nor that reliance on the failing company defense in the appropriate
circumstances would be unnecessary or misguided."' Rather, as applied to
those instances in which the acquired firm is beset with serious financial dif-
" See note 20 supra.
5 " The court suggested that Steiger's improved profit picture at the close of
fiscal 1973 might have precluded successful reliance on the failing company defense.
564 F.2d at 775 n.12. This finding of profitability. however, did not improve Steiger's
access to needed capital, which was the crux of the defendants' rebuttal case. Id. It is,
of course, also possible that Steiger had not made the thorough and unavailing search
for an alternative purchaser as is required to establish the failing company defense.
See note 20 supra.
''" See generally Note, All the King's Horses and All the king's Men: The Failing
Company Doctrine as a Conditional Defense to Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 4 HoysTRA L.
Rev, 643, 679 (1976). Apart front the fundamental distinction already noted in the
text, it is also significant that the effect of defendants' rebuttal evidence can itself he
overcome by evidence that reinforces the government's prima facie statistical case. See
generally L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRusT 602-03 (1977). Therefore, the General Dynamics "de-
lenses" properly are viewed not as establishing affirmative defenses, but rather as shift-
ing the burden of proof. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86, 120 (1975); United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Stipp. 78, 91-92 (1). Colo.
1975). By contrast, most courts have regarded the failing company defense as an af-
firmative, absolute defense. See, e.g., United States v. NI.P.N1.. Inc.. 397 F. Stipp. 78. 95
(I). Colo. 1975); but c.f. United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 606-07 (6th
Cir. 1970) (noting, without deciding, questimt whether failing company doctrine is a
complete defense).
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ficulties, Harvester could lessen the need in many cases to satisfy the extremely
stringent requirements of the failing company defense."'
In sum, reading General Dynamics in the retrospective light Of subsequent.
Supreme Court and lower court interpretations, it seems clear that the Court's
preference in General Dynamics for f'unctional rather than structural analysis
does not reject market shares as the primary indicia of probable competitive
effect, nor does it apparently go so far as to acknowledge defendants' rebuttal
arguments that increased concentration resulting from a merger will itself
yield procompetitive benefits."' The decision and its progeny do, however,
open up entirely new areas of "defense'' to section 7 challenges by inviting
merger defendants to offer quantitative and qualitative information pertinent
to the structure and dynamics of the relevant market., and to defendants' par-
"' See Fox, supra note 2. at 423-24. Although conceptually the failing company
defense and the Harvester defense are distinct, see text and notes 58-60 supra, the
distinction !nay create problems in application. as the cases seem to indicate. A conclu-
sion similar to that of Harvester can be found in United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 307 F.
Stipp. 78, 04 (1). Coln. 1975), where the court held that the deteriorating financial
position of one of the merged lirms was the "most significant'' of several factors refut-
ing the government's statistical case in support of its challenge to a merger of compet-
ing ready mix concrete producers. Cf. The Pillsbury Co„ 3 ' FRA DE Rio;. Rep. (CCH) 11
21,425 (FTC 1978) (although acquired company not a "failing company, - its precari-
ous financial condition was important factor in rebutting prima facie case). The issue
in /W.P.M., however, was somewhat clouded because the defendants were also held to
have established the failing company defense.
In United Stales v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Stipp. 956 (1). Conn. 1075), which involved
a horizontal merger in the copper industry, the defendants argued that the substantial
losses and costs of Copper Range, one of the contemplated merger partners, pre-
cluded that company's continued competitive viability in copper mining and refining.
Rejecting this defense as inadequate as a matter of law, the court stated that in General
Dynamics the acquired company was weak al the focal point of competition—
specifically, access to uncommitted coal reserves. Here, however, the "focus of competi-
tion - was production of copper concentrate and copper refining capacity, and in
neither of these markets was Copper Range deficient. Thus, inadequate financial re-
sources were irrelevant, unless, of course, the defendants attempted to qualify for the
failing company defense. Id. at 970-71. Amax may be viewed as an example of the
situation in which a company's weakened financial condition would not qualify for the
General Dynamir.s . and Harvester defense because the firm's financial condition would tint.
necessarily rebut the statistical evidence of the merger's probable anticompetitive inn-
pact. The court in Amax evidently believed that Copper Range's substantial copper
assets, in the hands of the acquiring firm, would likely produce substantial anticom-
petitive effects, regardless of how long the acquired firm itself would have stayed
afloat financially. See also Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., Dki. No. 90-80 (FTC
June 14, 1979).
In a recent private	 7 case, the Second Circuit avoided the question whether
General Dynamics applies when the acquired firm is alleged to he noncompetitive solely
because of financial difficulties. Resolution of the Harvester issue was unnecessary in
light of the Second Circuits Finding that the acquired firm was highly competitive. F.
& 31. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons. Inc., 1970-1 Trade Gas. 11 62,573, at
77,303 (2d Cir. 1079) (preliminary injunction),
" .2 See, e.g., United States v. A 113:17.Z. Inc., 402 F. Stipp. 056, 967 11.40 (1). Gomm.
1975); S 1-11 , 1 . 1 vAN, supra note at 624-25. But c.f. United States v. Inc., 397 F.
Stipp. 78. 92-03 (I). Colo. 1975) (because of pattern of consumer purchases, increased
production capacity of merged firms enhanced competition).
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ticular position and capabilities therein, to challenge the reliability of the gov-
ernment's market share and concentration analysis as a measure of probable
competitive effect." This significant turn from the structural-presumptive
standards of the Warren Court to extensive factual inquiry on a case-by-case
basis substantially escalates the burden on the government by forcing it to
develop its factual case well beyond the parameters of market share analysis,
at least in mergers involving an allegedly weakened or otherwise competitively
vulnerable company."
Apart from General Dynamics' rediscovery of a functional approach to
merger analysis, it is appropriate to note an additional aspect of the case—its
approach to market definition—which may create further difficulties for en-
forcement efforts. Ascertaining the relevant market is, of course, a critical
threshold determination in section 7 litigation since, under the statute,
analysis of probable competitive effects must refer to a defined product and
geographic context. Moreover, the mode of analysis employed to assess com-
petitive effect may differ given dissimilar market constructions inasmuch as
the breadth of market definition may determine whether a merger is viewed
"" Also of significance, at least in mergers involving natural resource indus-
tries, is that data on reserve holdings are often difficult fur the government enforce-
ment agencies 10 develop. Consequently, iu these instances, General Dynamics may
further add to the government's burden in its preliminary review of the subject
merger to determine whether § 7 challenge is advisable. See FTC Urges DOE to Adopt
Policy qf Full information-Sharing, 854 ANTITRUST & 'TRADE REG. Rio'. (BNA) A-17 to
A-I8 (Mar. 9, 1078); Shenefiefil Urges DOE to Aid in Data Collection for Antitrust Suits, id.
at A-22 to A-23.
' 4 A logical result of this expanded inquiry is increased reliance on findings of
fact by the trial court, a consequence clearly at issue in the majority's and dissenters'
differing resolution of factual issues in General Dynamics itself, and in United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
Also noteworthy in General Dynamics was the Court's approval of the district court's
reliance on post-acquisition evidence. The Court observed that the district court's use
of such evidence to show the changing nature of the coal industry and the depletion of
United Electric's uncommitted coal reserves was justified in that this was not the kind
of evidence that would "reflect a positive decision on the part of the merged com-
panies to deliberately but temporarily refrain from anticompetitive actions 415
U.S. at 506. The Court also noted that the prior decisions of the Court in United
States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (establishing susceptibil-
ity of merger to 7 challenge whenever post-acquisition evidence reveals anticompeti-
tive probabilities), and FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 502 (1965) (dis-
claiming value of post-acquisition evidence showing 110 anticompetitive effect), resulted
in a virtual "no-lose" situation for the government on the question of the probative
value of post-acquisition evidence. 415 U.S. at 505 n.13.
The approach of the General Dynamics Court in distinguishing between reliable and
suspect post-acquisition evidence has been reflected in subsequent lower court cases.
See United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 780 (7th Cir, 1977);
United States v. Black Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Stipp. 729, 748 n.37 (I), Md. 1076).
While General Dynamics' relaxed standard of acceptability of post-acquisition evi-
dence favorable to defendants certainly may impact on government enfOrcement ef-
forts, it is not significant to the critical premerger decisions of whether to proceed with
the acquisition in light of antitrust risks or, from the government's standpoint, whether
to seek a preliminary injunction.
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as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate." 5 In General Dynamics, the district
court rejected the selection of coal as a relevant product market in favor of a
broader "energy" market.. Additionally, the court chose smaller, more numer-
ous geographic markets over the government's statewide and industry sales
region market constructions. In the Supreme Court, the disputed market de-
finition issues were never resolved, which the Court itself recognized as a de-
parture from the "normal" procedure of first defining the relevant markets
within which probable competitive effects are measured." Here, however,
this usually "necessary precondition" became unnecessary in light of the
Court's conclusion that the government's case could not stand in any mar-
ket.
The Court's avoidance of market definition in General Dynamics stands in
marked contrast to the market. definition attitude of the Warren Court, at.
least with respect to geographic market definition. In United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co.," the Warren Court accepted the government's statewide, re-
gional, and nationwide geographic market constructions and at. the same time
explicitly relegated geographic market analysis to a distinctly secondary
role.'" The Court thus adopted a virtual presumption in favor of govern-
ment. geographic market definition. 7" If the same approach had been fol-
lowed in General Dynamics, acceptance of the government's geographic market
constructions would have been the predictable result. Perhaps, then, in cir-
cumventing the market definition issue in General Dynamics, the Court was
implicitly conveying a more critical view of the government's proffered mar-
kets than was evident in Pabst. 71
Whatever plausible inferences could be drawn from General Dynamics on
the issue of market definition, the Court soon afterwards dispelled any notion
1 ' 5 See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut. Nat'l Batik, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). In
this case, the district court chose the state of Connecticut as the relevant geographic
Market, but applied a potential competition—market extension analysis to the consolida-
non of two local banking entities in that. slate. In remanding the case for a proper
delineation of relevant markets, the Court observed that if the state were the relevant
market the subject banks would have been direct, not potential. competitors. Id. at 667.
The distinction between potential competition and horizontal analysis, as a practi-
cal consideration, may not have been highly significant under the Warren Court since
the government there was achieving consistent success under both approaches. The
distinction assumes greater importance today, however, because of the severe restric-
tions imposed by the Burger Court and the lower courts on the application of poten-
tial competition theory. See cases discussed at text and notes 78-153 infra.
"" 415 U.S. at 510.
17 hi. at 511 (citing 341 F. Supp. at 560).
"" 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
The Court stated: "Proof of the section of the country where the anticom-
petitive effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the crucial question in this and every 7
case which is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere in the
United States. - Id. at 549-50.
7 " Pabst has been read as dispensing with proof of geographic marke«lefini-
tion. See United States v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 2811 F. Supp. 1. 6 (ED. Pa. 1968). But
see United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 0.20 (1974) (reject-
ing this interpretation of Pabst).
n See, e.g., Fox, supra note 2, at 415 11.112; SULLIVAN, supra note 60, at. 6 11-12.
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of' a continuation of Pabst's minimum standards for acceptance of government
delineations of the relevant. geographic market. In Marine Bancorporation, 72 a
case involving a geographic extension into the metropolitan Spokane banking
market, the parties stipulated that Spokane was a relevant geographic market.
The government, however, while conceding the state was not a relevant mar-
ket, proposed that the state nonetheless was a "section of the country" under
section 7, primarily on a "linked oligopoly" theory. 73 Under this theory, the
subject merger arguably would trigger subsequent mergers in other local
banking markets, the ultimate result of which would be a statewide network of
local banking oligopolies engaging in parallel, interdependent behavior.
In rejecting this argument, the Court held that the "section of the coun-
try" criterion of section 7 was synonymous with the concept of a relevant
geographic market; 74 in potential competition cases that market is, quite sim-
ply, the area wherein the acquired firm sells its goods or serviceS. 75 The
Court's geographic market definition thus disallowed the government's theory
of anticompetitive impact of a market extension merger in a market in which
the acquired firm does not compete. More importantly, while the Court pur-
ported to base its holding on established market definition precedent, includ-
ing Pabst itself, 7 " the Court's conclusion signals a more circumspect evaluation
of proof of proper market definition than Pabst required."
72 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
7"
 hi. at 620.
74 hi. at 620 & n.18.
75 Id. at 620-21. This same holding was reiterated in United States v. Connect-
icut Nat'l Bank, 418  U.S. 656 (1974), decided the same day as Marine Bancorporation.
In challenging a proposed consolidation between banks operating in different
localities, the government offered the same statewide linked oligopoly theory as in
Marine Bancorporation, and also supported its statewide approach on the contention
that the consolidation would have a statewide impact by eliminating one of the rela-
tively few banks that could have expanded into other local markets throughout the
state. The Court, citing Marine Bancorporation, found no support for either of the gov-
ernment's arguments. Id. at 672-73. justice White's dissent, however, while not judging
the linked oligopoly approach, read the government's second argument as positing the
existence of relevant local markets other than those of the consolidated banks on the
premise that the banks individually might have entered local markets other than each
other's. Id. at 673-75. Justice White saw nothing in the Court's earlier cases precluding•
a determination that many local banking markets might have been relevant to the
challenged consolidation. /d. at 674-75.
In RSR Corp. v. FTC, 1979-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 62,450 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held
that the definition of relevant geographic market in Marine Bancorporation and Connect-
icut Nat'l Bank was not controlling in cases involving actual rather than potential com-
petition. Id. at 76,666. The court also indicated the possible inapplicability of the mar-
ket definition of Marine Bancorporation and Connecticut Nat'l Bank to mergers in which
the geographic areas of competition are not determined by regulation. Id.
418 U.S. at. 621 11.20. The Court read Pabst simply as finding three relevant.
markers. The Court did acknowledge, however, that. Pabst contained language suggest-
ing the absence of need for proof of geographic market areas.
" See Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 CoLum. L. REV. 243, 257-58
(1975). If this conclusion was only implicit in Marine Bancorporation, it was made
explicit in United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), discussed at
note 75 supra. Accepting Pabst's instruction that the government. need not define geo-
graphic markets by "metes and bounds," the Court added, "Lilt is nevertheless the
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II. POTENTIAL COMPETITION
From an enforcement perspective, the most troubling section 7 decisions
have come in response to government attempts to invoke the doctrine of po-
tential competition. As it developed during the Warren Court years, this doc-
trine essentially held that an acquiring company's entry into a new product or
geographic market. by acquisition of a substantial, existing firm violated sec-
tion 7 if the acquiring firm was either a probable unilateral 78 entrant (the
"actual entry" effect) or was perceived by market participants as threatening
to enter when competitive conditions appeared favorable (the "perceived en-
try" effect).'" As an enforcement tool, the potential competition doctrine as-
sumed increasing importance in the late 1960's and early 1 970's. The Burger
Court's 1974 decision in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc." and lower
court interpretations of that decision, however, appear to have virtually crip-
pled the potential competition doctrine as an effective merger enforcement..
mechanism."
Marine Bancorporation involved a geographic market extension merger of
Washington Trust Bank (WTB), the third largest bank in Spokane,
Washington, with the National Bank Of Commerce (NBC), Washington's sec-
ond largest. banking organization. WTB was not active outside of Spokane,
nor was NBC operating in WTB's Spokane market. The relevant market—
commercial banking in Spokane"—was extremely concentrated with the
three largest banks accounting for about 92 percent of total deposits. WTB
Government's role to come forward with evidence delineating the rough approxima-
tion of localized banking markets N. at 669-70. The Court also found that the
government's use of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) was not a proper
approximation of relevant local markets.
" As used herein, the ter'DI "unilateral" denotes entry by internal expansion or
toehold acquisition.
7 " Thus, actual entry theory concerns the acquisition's elimination of the possi-
bility of future (It:concentration resulting front unilateral entry of the acquiring firm.
In contrast, the perceived entry theory. variously labelled the "edge" or "wings"
theory, focuses on the acquisition's present lessening of competition through elimina-
tion of the moderating influence exerted by the acquiring company on the edge of the
market on the competitive behavior of firms in the market.
While the perceived entry doctrine has been sanctioned by the courts. see, e.g.,
United States v. Marine Bancorporation. Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 625 (1974), the actual
entry doctrine, because it focuses entirely on the lessening of future competition, has
been seriously questioned. The Supreme Court has twice expressly reserved the ques-
tion whether § 7 encompasses the actual entry theory. See id. at 639; United States v.
Falstaff. Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 5'26, 537 (1973).
418 U.S. 602 (1974).
81 The proper role, if any, of potential competition theory in § 7 analysis has
long been the subject of considerable academic comment. See, e.g., Rahl, Applicability of
the Clayton Ac! to Potential Competition, 12 ABA ANTITRUST S'EcTioN 128 (1958); Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1`362-86
(1965); Posner, supra note 25, at 313-25; Brodley, supra note 25; R. THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 246-62 (1978). See generally P. STEINER. MERGERS 255-87 (1975).
82 Although it stipulated that Spokane was a relevant geographic market, 418
U.S. at 619-20, the government. proposed other geographic market constructions
which the Court rejected. See text and notes 72-77 supra.
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held 18.6 percent of total deposits in the Spokane market. The Court. initially
held that the potential competition doctrine applies only to oligopolistic mar-
kets, 83
 a recognition that constitutes a inure explicit and restrictive view of the
doctrine's applicability than had been suggested by prior cases." After find-
ing the market to be highly concentrated based on the government's evidence
of concentration ratios, the Court, as noted earlier," relied upon General
Dynamics by questioning whether the government's concentration ratios accu-
rately reflected oligopolistic market conditions. Since the defendants had in-
troduced no persuasive rebuttal evidence of nonoligopolistic market behavior,
the Spokane market was an acceptable market. for application of the potential
competition doctrine. 8 "
As to the major thrust of the government's case—the actual entry
theory—the Court., as it had earlier done in United Stales v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp.," reserved judgment on whether elimination of a future entrant in itself
was legally sufficient. to condemn a merger under section 7." The Court.
maintained, however, that fist' the actual entry doctrine to apply, two factual
conditions must he met: (1) there must be feasible, available means of entry
other than through the challenged acquisition, and (2) such alternative means
of entry must offer a substantial likelihood of &concentrating the market or
producing other significant procompetitive effects."
With respect to the first condition, it was undisputed that NBC had the
necessary financial means and the incentive to cutter the market, and the gov-
ernment asserted that. NBC could have entered either through "sponsorship' .
of a new bank and subsequent acquisition of that bank," or through a
toehold acquisition."' While rejecting the sufficiency of proof demonstrating
the feasibility of either of these alleged alternative means of entry, the Court
assumed, for purposes of argument, that NBC conceivably could have entered
83
 418 U.S. at 630. See United States v. Hughes 'Fool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637,
645-46 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (four-firm concentration ratio of 51% in government's pro-
posed relevant market, with evidence of relative ease of entry and trend toward de-
concentration, precluded application of potential competition doctrine).
" See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2(1 67, 75-76 (10th Cir, 1972),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (although top 4 and 8 firms controlled only 29% and
40%, respectively. of relevant market, trend toward concentration permitted applica-
tion of potential competition doctrine).
85 See text at notes 28-311 supra.
418 U.S. at 631-32. Of course, the degree of concentration in the rekvant
market serves a different function in horizontal cases, such as General Dynamics, and
potential competition cases. As discussed earlier, in a horizontal case proof of sufficient
market concentration and market shares of the merging firms establishes prima facie
7 illegality. In a potential competition case, however, proof of sufficient concentration
establishes a prima facie case on wily one of several of the plaintiff's required ele-
ments of proof. See text at notes 83-86 supra. See generally Bauer. Challenging Conglom-
erate Mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Todav's Law awl Tomorrow's Legislation, 58
B.U. L. REV, 199, 207 (1978).
" 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973).
" 418 U.S. at 639.
8•1 Id. at 633.
°i' Id. at 633-34.
"' Id. at 637.
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WTB's market by such means." 2
 Because of regulatory constraints, however,
neither of these avenues satisfied the second prerequisite to application of the
actual entry theory since, in the Court's view, neither offered a realistic pros-
pect for NBC to make substantial procompetitive inroads into the relevant
market." 3
The Court quickly disposed of the government's perceived entry argu-
ment, declaring that "rational" commercial bankers in Spokane would have
been aware of the regulatory barriers to unilateral entry by NBC, and thus
would not have been significantly influenced in their competitive behavior by
NBC's presence outside the Spokane market." More important from an
analytical viewpoint was the Court's statement that the government's failure to
show availability of alternative means of entry likely to generate substantial
procompetitive effects was "determinative" in disposing of the perceived entry
issue.• Although less than explicit, this language suggests that the two fac-
tual conditions for considering actual entry are also prerequisites to applica-
tion of the perceived entry doctrine." Moreover, the Court. stated that the
presence of the acquirer outside the market must "in fact" have tempered the
actions of market participants."' This instruction, when read together with
the foregoing conditions, would seem to require proof that "rational" de-
cisionmakers in the market perceived the probability of the acquiring firm's
unilaterally entering the market and generating a substantial post-entry com-
petitive threat to existing market participants, and that these participants ac-
tually altered their market behavior accordingly. On the facts of Marine Ban-
corporation, then, the absence of Feasible means of entry from which substan-
tial procompetitive inroads could be made in the target market precluded any
plausible conclusion that NBC's external presence could have significantly
moderated the actions of bankers in the Spokane market.
Although the majority in Marine Banhcorporation was careful to emphasize
that it was analyzing a merger in a strictly regulated industry," justice White's
dissent saw the rationale of the "new anti-trust majority"" as redefining the
potential competition doctrine in a fashion that would apply to unregulated as
well as regulated industries.'" Specifically, Justice White recognized that
"2 Id. at 636, 638.
93 Id. at 636-37, 638. The Court cited the fact that a previously acquired
toehold bank in Spokane had captured only 2.2% of' the market in the eight-year
period following its acquisition by a large hank holding company. Id. at 638.
"4 Id. at 639-40.
"5 Id. at 639.
m See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729. 769 n.76
(D. Md. 1976) (see text and notes 148-50 infra.); Brodley, supra note 25, at 22 n.92;
Note, The Potential Competition Doctrine After Marine Bancorporation, 63 Gr.o. L.J. 969,
979-80 (1975).
" 7
 418 U.S. at 624-25.
"8
 Id. at 639, 641.
" 9 Id. at 642 (While, J., dissenting).
" 1 " See also Brodley. supra note 25, at 17. It is noteworthy that soon alter its
1974 decision in Marine Bancorporation, the Court affirmed in a per curiam memoran-
dum opinion a 1973 district court opinion in United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd nuon., 418 U.S. 906 (1974). The Court's
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Marine Bankcorporation's two conditions, taken together, would require the
government to prove feasibility and likelihood of unilateral entry plus likeli-
hood of effective competition generated by the new entrant subsequent to
entry. This latter standard, in Justice White's view, could not be limited solely
to cases involving regulatory constraints on entry and effective post-entry
competition. Rather, the test also would logically permit defendants' argu-
ments of economic barriers to effective competition,'" thereby markedly in-
creasing the burden of the government's proof in challenging mergers in un-
regulated as well as regulated industries.
Despite the Court's admonitions that Marine Bancorporation dealt with a
strictly regulated industry, the broad adverse impact of the decision on en-
forcement, efforts has been evident. in subsequent lower court rejections of
Antitrust Division and FTC potential competition challenges. The lower court
opinions, moreover, offer further, although not necessarily congruent, views
on the potential competition analysis of Marine Bancorporation. In two signifi-
cant instances, FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." 2 and BOC International Ltd. v.
FTC,'" the FTC has proceeded entirely on actual entry theory.'" thus
reiterating the Commission's affirmative answer!" to the question expressly
reserved in Falstaff and Marine Bancorporation—whether section 7 applies
when the only alleged anticompetitive probability is the elimination of a likely
future entrant in the relevant market.
In Atlantic Richfield,'" the Commission's potential competition argument.
was that. the merger of Anaconda, a major producer of cooper ore and con-
affirmance of the district court's decision in Phillips, however, cannot plausibly he read
as restricting the scope of Marine Bancorporation. Given the abundant factual evidence
supporting the district court's exhaustive analysis in Phillips, and considering the pres-
ent. Court's admonition to district courts in merger cases to develop a full factual rec-
ord and analyze the relevant law, see Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 615 n.13, it
may well have seemed anomalous for the Court to have reversed the district court's
decision in Phillips. Although the framework for potential competition analysis differed
as between Phillips and the subsequent redefinition of standards in Marine Bancorpora-
tion, the end result of' either [node of analysis on the particular - facts of Phillips may
well have beeen the same.
" 1 418 U.S. at 654 & 11.5 (White, J., dissenting).
"2 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977).
104 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
1 " The FTC's potential competition case also relied solely (and unsuccessfully)
on actual entry theory in Fruehauf Corp., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCM 11 21,402
(FTC 1978), and Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, [1973-1976 Trimsfer Binder) TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 20,944 (1975), W.01 sub non. Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, .540 F.2d
303 (7th Cir. 1976), The Fruehauf merger was held to violate § 7 on other grounds.
1 "5 The Commission has stated in a number of cases that elimination of a prob-
able actual entrant is sufficient to state a § 7 claim. See, e.g., The Budd Co., 86 F,T,C.
518, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 20,998, at 20,856 n.5
(1975); Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, [1973-1976 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 11 20,944, at 20,790 n.6 (1975) (citing cases).
""" 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977). This decision was on appeal from a district
court denial of the FTC's motion for it preliminary injunction pursuant to § 13(h) of
the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976), to enjoin the acquisition pending completion of'
administrative proceedings before the Commission. Enacted in 1973, § 13(b) has pro-
vided the basis for preliminary injunctive relief in three merger cases, all involving
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centrates and a major copper refiner,'" with Arco, a major producer of pe-
troleum, petroleum products, and natural gas, violated section 7 of the Clayton
Act and section 5 of the FTC Act. "s by eliminating Arco as a future entrant
into the concentrated copper production and refitting markets.'" At the
outset, the Fourth Circuit indicated its unwillingness to consider section 5 as a
separate basis for review of the Arco-Anaconda merger.'" While acknowl-
edging that section 5 has been viewed as supplementing the Clayton and
Sherman Acts, the court noted the lack of any precedent for the proposition
that a merger could be enjoined as a violation of section 5 and not section
7 . 111
As to the substantive merits of the FTC's section 7 actual entry claim, the
court viewed the ambiguity of the doctrine and the absence of supporting
Supreme Court precedent as sufficient in themselves to deny the preliminary
injunctive relief sought. 112 Nonetheless, the court proceeded to analyze the
Commission's case and deny the requested relief on substantive grounds. In
so doing, the court held that the FTC had failed to provide "strict proof of
any anti-competitive effect 11 " which according to the court was the mea-
sure of proof required in a case in which the sole alleged anticompetitive
probability was the elimination of a future entrant. into the market)' The
court, accepted the FTC's contention that Arco was ripe for diversification and
was financially able to enter the copper market unilaterally. Nevertheless, the
court found that other objective factors, including the long lead time for entry
and the additional technical expertise needed by Arco, ruled out the copper
industry as a probable de novo diversification target for Arco: 15
In addition to evidence of Arco's economic incentives, the FTC had in-
troduced considerable evidence that Arco had seriously contemplated entry
into the copper industry for some time, including evidence of approval by the
company's hoard of directors of diversification into the industry without limi-
tation as to the mode of entry.''" In the court's estimation, this evidence
showed only a "continuing interest'' in entering the copper industry through
horizontal mergers, challenged by the FTC. See FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539
F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp.. 459 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. 111.
1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1(188 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
Anaconda ranked third in copper Ore and concentrates, with 8.27% of the
market., and fourth in refined copper, with 9.78% of the market. 549 F.2d at 291.
I" 15 U.S.C. §, 45 (197(i).
'"" 549 F.2d at 292.
H" 1r1. at. 291-92
III Id.
" 2 Id. at 294.
" 3 Id. at 295.
"4 In its determination of the proper quantum of proof, the court relied
heavily on Professor Turner's analysis. See Turner, supra note 81, at 13(12-86. In actual
entry cases Turner would require "clear proof that the firm Would in fact have en-
tered ...." /d. at 1384. The court also noted. 549 F.2d at 294, that Turner's standard
of proof appears to have received passing approval in United States v. Marine Ban-
corporation. Inc.. 418 U.S. 012. (123-24 & n.24 (1974).
549 F.2(1 at 29(1.
1(;
March 1979]	 CLAYTON ACT SECTION 7	 503
the best means available.' ' 7 Moreover, while the court recognized that Arco's
lower-level management had recommended grass roots entry, the court. drew
a "fundamental distinction" between lower-level recommendations and com-
mitment by the company itself.'" The court dick not view the evidence as
establishing any commitment by Arco's top management to de novo entry in
copper. In supporting this conclusion, the court relied to some extent on sub-
jective evidence, primarily in the form of statements made by Arco officials
subsequent to the initiation of FTC administrative proceedings. Recognizing
the inherently suspect. nature of such statements, the court nonetheless felt
they were entitled to some weight in cases where, as here, the government.
had failed to present objective evidence establishing the likelihood of unilat-
eral entry.'"
Atlantic Richfield represents a significant setback for federal merger en-
forcement., and for the FTC in particular. First, as noted earlier, the court,
though in cursory fashion, refused to accept the use of section 5 as a possible
independent basis for challenging mergers.'" Second, without rejecting the
actual entry doctrine, the court's standard of "strict" proof in actual entry
cases is so difficult. to meet that if followed by other courts it will preclude any
realistic chance of the government's successfully challenging a merger on ac-
tual entry grounds. As the Court in Marine Bancorporation noted,
"[ulnequivocal proof that an acquiring firm actually would have entered de
nova but for the merger is rarely available." 121 Further, it is noteworthy in
this regard that the court's analysis in Atlantic Richfield focused primarily on
evidence relevant to Marine Bancorporation's first condition—the likelihood of
entry through available means other than the challenged merger.'" Presum-
ably, however, under the Fourth Circuit's standard if the government sustains
its burden of "strict" proof on the entry issue, the courts would then require
strict proof that entry would produce cleconcentration or other significant
procompetitiye effects—the second condition articulated in Marine Bancorpora-
17 Id. al 296-97.
11" Id. at 297 n.9.
11 " The court based its use of subjective evidence on the statement in Falstaff
that subjective evidence 'may serve as a counterweight to weak or inconclusive objec-
tive data. - 549 F.2d at 298 (quoting United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 570 (1973) (Marshall, j., concurring)).
120 Sec text at 'ones 110-11 supra. Bul see Nestle Alimentana S.A., Dkt. No.
9003, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss for Lack of jurisdiction, at 9-12 (Admin. L. J.
Decision April 24, 1978): cf. United States v. American Bldg -. Maintenance Indus., Inc.,
422 U.S. 271, 279 n.7 (1975) (reiterating breadth of 5 as supplementing Clayton
Act). See also Interview with Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., 848 ANTITRUST & TRADE: REG.
REP. (BNA) at AA-1, 2 (Jan. 26, 1978), wherein Mr. Dougherty, head of the FTC's
Bureau of Coro petition, indicates that 5 can he used to reach conglomerate mergers,
but adds that. a determinative judicial test on this point is required.
121 418 U.S. at 624 (footnote omitted). See also Turner, supra note 81, at 1384,
indicating that "clear proof - of entry but for the merger would be "an admittedly rare
case. -
122 The court's acknowledgment of the existence of other equally likely en-
trants, however, more appropriately falls under the second condition. See Brodley,
supra note 25, at 23 n.97.
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lima. As severe as the Fourth Circuit's burden of proof is on the entry condi-
tion, compounding this burden by imposing the strict proof standard 1'23 on
the post-entry competitiveness issue would confront. the enforcement agencies
with an insuperable barrier.'"
In BOC Inier»raional Ltd. v. FTC,'' 5 the most recent case in which the FTC
relied exclusively on actual entry theory, the Second Circuit. expressed skepti-
cism as to the validity of Marine Bancorporation's second condition, and refined
Marine Bancorporation's first condition to specify the approximate time frame
against which the likelihood of entry is to be measured. The FTC had deter-
mined in administrative proceedings''' that the acquisition by BOC, a British
company, of controlling interest in Airco, an American firm, violated section 7
by eliminating BOC as a potential actual entrant into Airco's United States
market. BOC was the world's second largest producer of industrial gases,
while Airco was the third largest United States industrial gas producer, with
about. 16 percent. of a market in which the top three producers held 60 per-
cent. The FTC's holding of illegality was based entirely on the actual entry
theory, since the Commission found that the acquisition's only anticompetitive
impact. was its elimination of the reasonable probability that. BOG would even-
tually enter the United States market unilaterally)"
23
 It may be possible conceptually to limit the court's'strict proof standard to
"pure" conglomerate or diversification mergers, which is the characterization applied
by the Fourth Circuit to the Arco-Anaconda combination. The Fourth Circuit noted
that use of this evidentiary standard was appropriate with respect to a "conglomerate
merger [which] involves no product or market extension ...." 549 F.2d at 295. Thus,
it may he queried whether the product or market extension merger would be sub-
jected by the Fourth Circuit to the strict proof' standard.
There are, however, a number of problems with the suggested limitation. Distinc-
tions between product extension and pure conglomerate mergers are largely matters
of degree. Although entry into copper may not be viewed as a logical extension of oil,
natural gas, and uranium operations, these industries are all capital intensive, high
risk, mineral extraction industries, so there is certainly plausible basis for the FTC's
viewing Arco's move as something less than "pure" diversification, despite the Fourth
Circuit's characterization. Moreover, the Second Circuit, in rejecting the Fourth Cir-
cuit's standard in a geographic market extension case, BOC Intl Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d
24, 28 11.7 (2d Cir. 1977), see text and notes 125-31i infra, did riot attempt to distin-
guish the Fourth Circuit's test as limited only to pure conglomerate mergers.
' 24
 Asa related consideration, in weighing whether the FTC had met its heavy
burden of proof, the court, as noted earlier, was willing to consider admittedly suspect
subjective evidence, at least for the limited purpose of countering what the court con-
sidered weak evidence introduced by the FTC. The combined impact from an en-
forcement. standpoint of the Fourth Circuit's standard of proof and the type of' evi-
dence relied upon by the court has led one FTC official 10 remark that "[dills decision
raises serious questions about the law enforcement agencies' ability to withstand an
increasingly severe burden of proof, which, together with an undue reliance by the
courts on subjective evidence, is forcing us to review completely potential competition
merger theory.- Remarks of Daniel C. Schwartz, Deputy Director, Federal Trade
Commission, "The FTC's Role in the Present Competitive Environment," at 21-22.
Lewis and Clark Law School Third Annual Antitrust Symposium (Feb. 24, 1978).
' 5 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
12 ' British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, [1973-1976 TRANSFER BIN DER I TRADE
REG. - REP. (CCU) ¶ 21,963 (1975).
'27 557 12,2t1 at 26.
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On appeal,' 2 s the Second Circuit rejected the FTC's decision. 129 The
court found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of actual entry theory since
it held that the Commission's legal standard of "reasonable probability of even-
tual entry" ' 3" was an incorrect interpretation of the entry condition of Marine
Bancorporation. The court saw no analytical error in the use of a "reasonable
probability" measure of proof, and created a split in the circuits by expressly
rejecting the Fourth Circuit's "strict" proof requirement in actual entry
cases."' The notion of "eventual" entry was unacceptable to the court, how-
ever, in that it failed to tie the claim of probable actual entry to some approx-
imate time "at. least" 132 in the reasonably "near" future. In this context, "near"
could he ascertained by reference to the entry barriers and lead time neces-
sary for entry in the particular industry." '' 3 a Since the FTC had failed to
provide any temporal projection of BOC's probable entry other than the
128 Strictly speaking, the case was before the court on BOC's petition to review
the FTC's divestiture order. Id. at 25.
12 " Id. at 31.
'"" Id. at. 28.
'"' Id. at 28 n.7.
172 The court noted that souse, albeit unclear, authority could be cited for the
proposition that probable entry must be "imminent," but the court deemed it unneces-
sary to address the validity of this standard. Id. at 29 (citing United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 (1974)).
'" 557 F.2d at 29. This standard introduces yet another element of difficulty
into the enforcement picture. Requiring that entry he shown as probably occurring
within the "near" future, as defined by the court, necessarily means that the decision
to enter be made in the very short term. See Brodley, supra note 25, at 52 n.204, Thus,
while the Second Circuit bypassed the "imminence" of' entry standard, see note 132
supra, it adopted essentially an "imminence" of decision standard. As a result, in most
cases the enforcement agency will have to establish that current management had com-
mitted the company to unilateral entry. As has been recognized, this inevitably in-
creases the importance of subjective evidence of present management's intention,
which, from an enforcement perspective, is clearly not the most desirable type of evi-
dence, particularly if it is to be evaluated as the Fourth Circuit did in Atlantic Riekfield.
See BrodleN, supra note 25, at 52 n.204.
In an apparent effort to minimize the potential impact of the Second Circuit's
"near future" requirement and its resultant evaluation of the importance of subjective
evidence, the Commission in Fruehauf Corp., Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 21,402
(FTC 1978), declared that proof of likelihood of' actual entry in the near future should
not be viewed as an essential requirement in potential competition cases. Although it
held the evidence insufficient to establish Fruehauf as a probable actual entrant, the
Commission took pains to advance its view that the importance under § 7 of preserv-
ing the acquirer as a potential entrant which might enter the market if existing par-
ticipants raised prices to supracompetitive levels would not be recognized by a re-
quirement that likelihood of entry be established "within some brief period of time" or
that the "time of entry be specified in absolute terms rather than contingent. ones ...."
Id. at 21.376-77. Such projections of "contingent" time of likely entry, the Commission
posited, could be based on objective evidence of likelihood of entry under appropriate
market conditions. Its turn, the probahle occurrence of such market conditions, such as
sufficient price increases by firms in the market, could also be inferred from objective
evidence. Subjective evidence of management's entry intent would he minimized in
importance in light of the inferences that might he drawn from objective evidence on
the issue of likelihood of entry when market conditions were favorable, Id. at 21,377
n.33.
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"wholly speculative" eventuality assertion, likelihood of entry had not been
established. 134
The FTC's failure in BOC International to satisfy Marine Bancorporation's
first condition obviated any need to analyze whether entry would precipitate
deconcentration or other important procompetitive effects. In dictum, how-
ever, the court questioned the importance of this second condition of Marine
Bancorporation because the entry of a large firm in an oligopolistic market
"necessarily has significant procompetitive effects ...." ' 35
 In expressing this
reservation, the court appeared to be focusing on the short-term competitive
reverberations that can reasonably be expected when a large, well-financed,
and aggressive company breaks into a new market. In contrast, although the
language and analysis in Marine Bancorporation provide little illumination, it
appears that the Supreme Court was thinking more of longer-term structural
market alterations flowing from the unilateral entry of the acquiring com-
pany.' 3" If the latter interpretation is correct., the second condition of Marine
Bancorporation stands as a significantly greater evidentiary obstacle than the
Second Circuit's opinion in BOC International would suggest.
Whatever the merits of the Second Circuit's view of Marine Bancorpora T
lion's second condition for application of the actual entry doctrine, the validity
of this prerequisite has been accepted in two district court cases.'" In
neither instance, however, was the standard necessary to resolution of the po-
The Commission in Fruehauf did not view its aforementioned position as necessar-
ily inconsistent with the Second Circuit's opinion in BOG International since, according
to the Commission, both positions cited objective evidence as determining projected
entry times. Id. However, defining the projected time of entry requirement in terms of
lead time and entry barriers, as the Second Circuit did, fixes the temporal projection
on a more definite, and presumably shorter, duration nine standard than the Commis-
sion's approach in Fruehauf would appear to require.
134 557 F.2(1 at 29. Inasmuch as the FTC's legal construction of the entry pre-
condition was incorrect, the court did not reach the question whether, if' the proper
standard had been used, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
Commission's decision. Id. at. 28.
135 Id. at 27 (citing Ford Motor Co, v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 587 (1972)
(Burger, J., concurring and dissenting)); Turner, supra note 81. at 1383 (new entrain
will "shake things tip ...even if in the end its inroads are rather modest"); Robinson,
Antitrust Developments.: 1973, 74 CoLum. L.. REV, 163, 186 (1974) (new entrant will gen-
erate "competitive motion").
13" 418 U.S. at 636-39. "[T]he Government
	
simply did not establish the sec-
ond precondition. It failed to demonstrate that the alternative means offer :t reasonable
prospect of long-term structural improvement or other benefits in the target mar-
ket." hi. at 638-39. See Note, The Potential Competition Doctrine After Marine Bancorpora-
tion, 63 GE°. L.J. 969, 977-79 (1975). Much of the difficulty in applying Marine Ban-
corporation's second condition stems from the absence of any indication in the Court's
opinion of the meaning of "other significant procompetitive effects." Thus. although
the second condition is cast in terms of "deconcentration or other significant procom-
petitive effects," lower courts necessarilly will focus solely or primarily on the long-
term deconcentration aspect of this standard. See text and notes 141-44 iufra; Bauer,
supra note 86, at 216.
'" FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Stipp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977): United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Stipp, 729 (1). Md. 1976). For a discussion of Tenneco,
see notes 144 & 153 infra.
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Lerida! competition allegations before the court. In United States v. Black and
Decker Manufacturing Co.,'" the government sought divestiture of Black and
Decker's interest in the McCulloch Corporation. Black and Decker was the
nation's leading producer of portable electric tools, while McCulloch was a
leading firm in the highly concentrated gasoline powered chain saw mar-
ket.'• The government's complaint alleged a lessening of potential competi-
tion through elimination of Black and Decker as a likely actual entrant into
the chain saw market..
Rejecting this contention, the court in Black and Decker held that the gov-
ernment had not satisfied the entry condition of Marine Bancorporation. While
Black and Decker had a strong history of internal growth as well as the incen-
tive to enter the gasoline powered chain saw market, other factors, particu-
larly the company's lack of expertise in gasoline engine technology, 140 mili-
tated against the conclusion that Black and Decker had the capabilities for
entry via internal expansion. Further, the court doubted the availability of
toehold entry possibilities and added that even if toehold acquisition candi-
dates had existed, they represented an improbable foundation for the (lc:con-
centration or other procompetitive effects required by Marine Bancorporation's
second condition."' The court's determination on this point, much like that
in Marine Bancorporation itself, was based on the finding that the continuing
high concentration in the relevant. market and the related inability of small
firms or new entrants to capture a substantial market, share precluded a
toehold precipitating deconcentration or other procompetitive ef-
fects.'"
The court's application of Marine Ba»carporation's second condition points
up the difficulties inherent in this evidentiary standard. In Black and Decker,
the court dismissed the possibility of "deconcentration or other significant
procompetitive effects" essentially by finding continued high concentration
and the absence of evidence of a trend toward deconcentration generated by
smaller firms in the market." 3 If, then, the market historically has remained
highly concentrated despite the presence of smaller firms or new entrants,
significant deconcentration by de novo or toehold entry is deemed improb-
able. lf, on the other hand, evidence of a substantial trend toward deconcen-
tration indicates that the possibility of further deconcentration following de
novo or toehold entry must be seriously considered, defendants may well
argue persuasively that, the market, despite still facially high concentration
138 4311 F. Stipp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
1 " The relevant product market was the manufacture and sale of gasoline pow-
ered chain saws; an "occasional user" submarket consisting of gasoline powered chain
saws retailing for less than S200 also was found. hi. at 740.
14" The court noted in this regard that no electric tool maker had ever entered
the gasoline powered chain saw market by internal expansion. hi. at 758.
141 Id. at 765-69.
t42 Id. at 768-69. Of course, the cited reasons for this conclusion differed since
Marine Baneorporalion focused on regulatory constraints on post-entry expansion. a fac-
tor not present in the unregulated market context of Black and Decker.
142 Id. at 755.
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ratios, is nonoligopolostic and thus inappropriate for potential competition
analysis.'"
In addition to its actual entry contentions, the government in Black and
Decker alleged section 7 violations based on the perceived entry theory. The
court's observations on Marine Bancorporation's treatment of perceived entry
are instructive if only to affirm explicitly what Marine Bancorporation had left.
ambiguous. The court in Black and Decker found that the government had
failed to establish that the participants in the gasoline powered chain saw
market. perceived Black and Decker as a likely market entrant."' The evi-
dence on the point was at best conflicting, with some major chain saw par-
ticipants viewing BlaCk and Decker's unilateral entry as likely, and others see-
ing no entry threat.' Moreover, even assuming sufficient proof of entry
perceptions, both subjective and objective evidence revealed the presence of a
number of other equally if not more likely entrants into the relevant mar-
"Thus, the loss of one potential entrant could not impact substantially
on competition in the market if there were more than a few other perceived
potential entrants.
None of this adds anything novel to established analysis of perceived en-
try. The Black and Decker court, however, also concluded that Marine Bancorpo-
ration's two actual entry conditions applied as well to perceived entry
them-y. 148 In short, contrary to the apparent view of United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp.,"• perceptions of the acquiring firm's incentives and capabilities
for entry are insufficient; the evidence must also establish perceptions by
market participants that the acquiring firm's means of de novo or toehold
entry offer reasonable probability of deconcentrating the target. market. As
suggested earlier, this reading of Marine Bancorporation seems a logical in-
terpretation of the Supreme Court's language.'" Nevertheless, Black and Deck-
er's explicit construction of the language adds a clearer judicial view of
Marine Bancorporation's enhanced constraints on the applicability of perceived
entry theory. Considering the problem of proving entry perceptions, as Black
144 This anomaly prompted the district court in FIT. v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F.
Stipp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977), to assert in dictum that the actual entry doctrine is "self-
contradictory. - Although the court was not expressly referring to Marine Bancorpora-
tion's second condition, the court's statement that in an oligopolistic market "it would
be difficult., if not impossible, for a toehold or de novo entry by an outsider to threaten
entrenched existing firms," id. at 109 n.5, quite clearly reflects the court's perception
of the difficulty of proving that new entry will generate the substantial clec.oncentration
required by Marine Bancorporation.
In analyzing the FTC's actual entry theory on the merits, the court held that the
likelihood of entry had not been established. The court further found that the Com-
mission had presented little or no evidence that available means of entry, if' any, could
reasonably produce deconcentration or other significant procotupetitive effects. Id. at
114.
145
 430 F. Stipp at 769-73.
"" Id. at 770-71.
147 Id. at 771-73.
' 4 ' Id, at. 769 H.76.
" 9
 410 U.S. 52e, 533-34 (1973) (perceptions of entry intent and capabilities are
(leterminative).
"" See text and note 96 supra.
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and Decker itself illustrates,'" requiring an added showing of perceptions of
the likelihood of prospects for substantial procompetitive effects 152 com-
pounds an already onerous burden of proof.'"
CONCLUSION
In several major respects the decisions of the Burger Court. reflect a con-
siderably more restricted view of section 7 than had been indicated by prior
cases. The Court's unwillingness to accept market share data as conclusive
indicia of probable competitive effect in horizontal merger cases, and, more
significantly, its restructuring of potential competition analysis already have
clearly hampered government enforcement efforts in the lower courts. Not-
withstanding the assistance of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger require-
ments, 154 these recent case developments, coupled with the likelihood of a
more rigorous review of government proof on the often critical threshold
issue of market definition, portend a difficult and largely unpredictable
course for government section 7 enforcement.
151 See text and note 140 supra.
'' As a matter of proof, the requirement of Alarine Bancorporation that the
market participants "in fact" tempered their oligopolistic behavior as a result of the
acquiring firm's presence on the periphery of the market may subsume the apparent
requirement of proof of perceptions that entry would likely produce significant pro-
competitive benefits. Proof of perceptions of entry intent and capabilities, coupled with
proof of significant responsive moderation of competitive behavior by firms in the
market, would permit. the reasonable inference that existing market participants must
have perceived entry as a likely means of substantially threatening their market posi-
tions. Of course, although this view minimizes Marine Bancorporation's second condition
as a distinct element of proof in perceived entry cases, it obviously does not circumvent.
the problem of establishing that the firms in the marker actually altered their behavior
in response to the acquirer's perceived presence at the market's edge.
' 53 The problems associated with applying the perceived entry doctrine, at least
in the context of product extension cases like Black and Decker, were recognized in FTC
v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Stipp. 105 (1).D.C. 1977). There, in addition to its actual entry
allegations, see note 144 supra, the Commission argued that Tenneco, a leading pro-
ducer of automotive exhaust system parts, and Monroe. a large producer of shock
absorbers, were perceived entrants into each other's respective product markets. In
addition to finding the absence of likelihood of unilateral entry and the presence of
numerous other equally likely entrants, the court accurately observed that the per-
ceived entry doctrine "rarely'' has been applied in product extension cases. id. at 114
n.22. This comment correctly if only implicitly recognizes that in most product exten-
sion cases proximity to the target market, and perceptions of proximity, become it
more difficult limiter of proof than in market extension cases.
154 See note 0 supra,
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